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Abstract  The paper examines individual motivation 
about social capital, measured by willingness to accept of 
compensation to leave individually valued social relations 
behind in moving from an ideal-type mid-western rural 
community, referred to “Nirvana.” The Heckman two steps 
method is applied to analyze a survey conducted in Nirvana. 
In Step1, 665 observations are used to run a Probit estimate 
on the individual decision to move. In Step2, 438 
observations are used to perform a Semi-log OLS estimate of 
social capital value. The empirical analysis suggests that 
social capital investment is driven by the dual motivation 
represented in an egoistic based self-interest and an 
empathy-sympathy based other-interest, both of which are 
jointly pursued within the own-interest. This finding implies 
that community development strategies need to determine 
the nature of orientation when internalizing the own-interest 
of individuals in the community in question. This paper 
provides direct empirical evidence to support that both 
self-interest and other-interest motivate the investment of 
social capital in a well-developed rural community. It also 
helps understanding why some rural communities achieve a 
higher state of economic development and community 
vitality than others. To answer question about what level of 
self-interest conditioned by the shared other interest works 
best, will require further testing in various communities, 
other than just one case study.  
Keywords  Social Capital, Rural Development, Joint 
Interest, Probit Model, Semi-log OLS Estimation 
JEL Classification: R22 
 
1. Introduction 
Historically, there have been two broad intellectual 
streams in explaining social action. One, following the work 
of most sociologists, sees the actor as a socialized individual, 
with actions governed by social norms, perhaps even willing 
to sacrifice self-interest to achieve shared other-interest in 
the greater good. The other, following on the work of most 
economists, sees the actor having goals independently 
arrived at, and acting wholly on self-interest. In the latter 
conception, social capital has no role itself, which seems 
contrary to experience. During the past-20 years, researchers 
have found empirical evidences that social capital explains 
the difference in economic growth rate[1], regional 
difference in economic success[2], and difference in 
economic outcomes [3-4]. Based on a set of survey, Schmid 
and Robison [5] tests for the existence of social capital and 
explores its impact on productivity and utility. Reference [5] 
concludes that social capital is a productive asset, which 
does affect transaction cost in farmland leasing [6], and the 
identity of the parties to a market transaction does affect the 
price. While Onyx and Bullen [7], Cordes et al [8], and 
Rupasingha, et al[9] have actually measured the social 
capital in term of attachment value to one's community, and 
Rupasingha et al. [9] also identified ethnic homogeneity, 
attachment to place as potential determinants of production 
of social capital at the U.S. county level. Teilmann [10] 
applies an index method to measure the accumulation of 
social capital in rural development, has tested the 
connections between motivation of pursing rural 
development and degree of social capital in Denmark, and 
suggests that higher level of motivation leads to increased 
social capital. Pochebut [11] uses a descriptive model to 
demonstrate four different strategies of managing social 
capital, and suggests that the allocation of strategies is based 
on two criteria: pro-social or pro-self orientation. They argue 
that individuals should carefully choose the strategy as an 
instrument for achieving social welfare, which suggests that 
motivation of accumulation social capital is from 
maximizing its own welfare, such as enhancing production 
efficiency [12-15]. 
Intriguingly, little research has been done on exploring by 
empirical test what actually motivates individuals to invest in 
and consume the product emerging from social capital. In 
this paper we'll examine the motivation behind individuals' 
choice to invest in social capital using empirical study. 
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Generally, many previous studies suggest either that 
self-interest itself [16-17] or a self-interest driven reciprocity 
[18] triggers an individual’s willingness to invest in social 
capital. On the other side, reference [19-21] suggest that 
social capital is motivated by sympathy, and in some sense 
social capital is sympathy, which seems to put emphasis on a 
shared other-interest, and is consistent with the meaning of 
social capital in sociology, albeit this is an argument being 
made by these economists.  
A number of researchers from both traditions (economics 
and sociology) have recognized these opposite perspectives, 
and have attempted to impart some of the insights and 
orientations from the one to the other. The examples of 
studies [22-25] argue that mono-motive theories fail to 
explain individual behavior, and people go beyond 
benefit-seeking-based self- interest. Bowles and Gintis [26] 
use game theory and experimental economics to examine the 
role of social capital, and suggest that individual motivations 
supporting community governance are the integration of 
self-interested preferences and unconditional altruism 
towards fellow community members. We can also make 
sense of the Putnam [27] contention that social capital is on 
the decline by a shift toward the more individualistic path 
and away from the shared other-interest path, a discernible 
trend in the U.S. in the last few decades.  
Most sociologists believe that rational actor theory is 
inadequate for sociological assessment of economic 
structures and process, because actors not only are driven by 
self-motives, but also portray a mixture of motives in their 
decisions [28]. The challenge to economic sociology is to 
find a better way to represent both under- and 
over-socialized version of human behavior [29]. The same 
challenge is faced in behavioral economics, as McCloskey 
[30] characterizes it, the focus of traditional economics only 
on one virtue, maximizing utility version of the person, and 
the real possibility for conditioned self-interest is left out. 
Solomon [31] argues that Smith’s moral sentiments are 
really sympathies, and there would be no motivation for 
ethics without compassion (sympathy). These ethics, driven 
by shared sympathies arising from projection through 
empathizing with others, in turn, are essential to achieving 
own interest, including self-interest and shared other 
(sympathetic, ethical)-interest. The integrated theories from 
evolutionary psychology, neuroscience and socioeconomics 
are used in several studies [32-35] to demonstrate and 
recognize the existence of dual motives behind the 
formulation for reciprocity and exchange behavior of 
humans.  
Social science literature generally has not adequately 
explained why social capital is produced, invested in, and/or 
consumed in the first place. And little has been said about 
what role it may play in guiding individual behavior and 
community development, at least not with empirical 
evidence. The fundamental questions yet to be answered 
include: Does social capital exist? Whether it exists only 
because individuals expect it to further their self-interest? 
Will individual share a common other-interest, which in turn, 
results in tempering self-interest pursuit? Scholars attracted 
to the concept of social capital seem to implicitly see the 
duality in human behavior, seeing there could an important 
role of social capital stocks in reducing the incidences of 
other social problems, reflecting other-interest, having an 
impact on economic development, and reflecting the 
individualistic self-interest. In this study, we have solid 
empirical evidence to support the co-existence of 
self-interest and other-interest represented in survey based 
experiments, and recognizes the dual motives, emerging as 
the simultaneous pursuit of both interests. 
2. Method and Data 
The bulk of the social capital and development literature 
provides little direct empirical evidence to support the 
concept of either self-interest or other-interest motivates the 
investment of social capital, none of which focusing on the 
possibility these two interests are jointly pursued. We focus 
herein on joint motives in a case study of “Nirvana” (so 
named in an earlier paper from this study, Cordes et al [8]). 
Nirvana is known to be a community wherein individuals 
experience a relatively high level of community and 
economic vitality, arguably higher than many other rural 
areas in USA. We hypothesize that the observed viability is 
likely due to a sympathy influenced emergence of a 
conditioned self-interest, the degree to which reveals a major 
reason for the emergence and existence of Nirvana-type 
places. 
The survey was conducted in 2000, and collected 1012 
residents’ perspectives, including detailed measurements on 
a standard psychology scale about the extent to which 
self-interest is a driver in their economic choices. The fact 
that 68-percent of those surveyed did respond (survey was 
sent to everyone having a Nirvana zip code), which is much 
higher than the “usual” survey response rates of 
20-30-percent, and such high response alone indicates 
something is different in this community. Even the survey 
response rate suggests a larger sense of shared other-interest 
at work and being in sympathy with one another, as 
68-percent of residents in this community were willing to 
help a research team better understand the driving forces in 
their community.  
As described in detail in Cordes et al. [8] contingent 
valuation methodology was applied to obtain a quantitative 
measure of the dollar value of social capital. The key 
question (Q16) used to form the dependent variable, which 
gives dollar value relating to consuming social capital good q 
(implicitly investing in the social capital to produce it). The 
respondent was told that the new job would be about the 
same in terms of job satisfaction; they currently know no one 
in the new community; which is similar on other fronts, 
except that close friends, business associates, etc.. And the 
new place is also at some distance; limiting the opportunities 
for only a few to no visits back to Nirvana per year. As a 
result, the respondent would lose all their current social 
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capital after moving. As Sally [36] argues, being in 
sympathy with someone else generally requires 
proximity-with. The respondents answered two questions 
pertaining to form this dependent variable:  
1) Would you and your household consider leaving 
Nirvana for additional income?  
__No, I cannot imagine my household leaving no matter 
how much money was offered. 
__Yes, for enough income, we would move. 
2) If yes, how much additional annual income would it 
take to get your household to move?  
In effect, we measure the value of social capital good 
foregone as an opportunity cost, how much would be 
sacrificed in social connections by leaving. Also, the idea is: 
if individuals are purely self-interested as traditional 
economics suggests, everyone would answer “yes.” All 
respondents in the survey would choose to leave the 
community for even modest amounts of additional income, 
and suggesting individuals are purely monetary driven. So 
the empathy-sympathy represented in social capital does not 
motivate staying in its own right. What we actually observe 
in the case of Nirvana is inconsistent with such speculation, 
and is especially demonstrated by a substantive number of 
residents unwillingness to even consider moving from 
Nirvana at all, i.e. 38-percent of the respondents said “no” 
(with 68-percent of the population responding, we feel quite 
confident to claim the representativeness of whole 
population in the area). For the 62-percent answering “yes,” 
social capital is more fundamentally an economic good, 
albeit as we will see in the empirical results, there is still a 
varying degree of shared other-interest conditioning the 
dollar value.  
Overall, these questions give dependent variables of the (0, 
1), (0, X) and continuous X-type, the latter for those who said 
“yes” and gave a dollar estimate. Because only those who 
answered “yes” have given the dollar measure on social 
capital, which creates a potential sample bias problem, a 
sample selection model proposed by Heckman [37] was 
applied, using Shazam student version 10.0  
Step 1 is the decision stage for individuals to decide 
whether the social capital good can be monetized, where the 
dependent variable (y1) is binary choice. 1 corresponds to the 
answer “Yes”, considering the possibility of leave, and 0 is 
“No,” not considering leave even with a promising financial 
opportunity. For this decision, the independent variables 
include the degree of selfishness(X1); how self-interest is 
conditioned by others (X2), implicitly by the shared 
other-interest); how self-interest is conditioned by the 
perceived degree of control over one’s own decision(X3); 
household net annual income after taxes (X4); self-interest in 
a job(X5); other-interest in a job (X6),with particular 
reference to coworkers); and an interaction term between the 
last two terms(X5*X6). The overall result is a representation 
of the own-interest in social capital which represents the 
internally integrated and balanced self- and other-interest. 
Step 2 is the dollar valuation stage for choosing leave. The 
dependent variable (y2) is the additional annual income 
required by respondents who are willing to monetize the 
social capital through willingness to move for more money, 
represented in the natural logarithm of the dollar value. The 
independent variables include all variables except the degree 
of selfishness (x1) defined in step1, plus the IMR (Inverse 
Mill’s Ratio, correcting the sample selection bias caused by 
the correlation between the two steps).  
The questionnaire draws heavily on the meta-economic 
approach. The possibility that individuals may pursue mainly 
for measures of selfishness, while those with wiliness to be 
influenced by others, perhaps evolves a shared other-interest 
in making this community better. The meta-economic 
approach also elevates the matter of both self-control and 
external control by others to a higher plane. Lester [38] 
suggests that it is human nature to continually wrest away 
from the inherent control asserted by others, and always 
seeking autonomy, expressed as being complementary to the 
pursuit of self-interest. So, wanting more individual control 
and self-interest tends to work together. 
On the other hand, the influence of others tends to work 
counter to the pursuit of the self-interest. If influence of 
others is found a driver, this simply indicates the individual 
tends to condition the pursuit of self-interest on the 
other-interest, after answering the question “how would I 
wish to be treated if it were me in that situation?” With 
symbiosis in both interests inherent to the process and 
synergy a real possibility as argued earlier. 
Due to the incomplete answers in the survey, 665 
observations are used for the Step 1 analysis. Among 665 
respondents, 438 individuals say ‘yes’ and are willing to 
sacrificing the social capital (connection) by leaving this 
community for extra money. And 227 individuals say ‘no’, 
as social capital is not something to them that can be 
converted into money. The level of money information from 
438 individuals is used in Step 2 analysis. 
The description of all variables is listed in Table1. The 
variable X1 used to measure the tendency toward pursuing 
the self-interest is the average of the reversed Q28 items, 
items1 like “Thinking of yourself first is no sin in this world 
today” and “Call it selfishness if you will, but in this world 
today we all have to look out for ourselves first”, while the 
scales on the Q28 items are reverse coded before entry into 
the regression analysis. This is a commonly used for 
psychological scale, developed by Phares and Erskine [39]. 
The influence variable X2 is X1 multiplied by influence, 
drawn from the individual components of Q19, items like 
“My close friends/neighbors believe I should stay” measured 
on an extremely unlikely to extremely likely scale, 
multiplied by the respective components of Q20, items 
pertaining to whether the respondent placed an extremely 
low-extremely high value on “Views of friends/neighbors” 
resulting in an expectancy-valence variable, a proxy for the 
utility gained from being influenced by others. 
                                                             
 
1 All items are available at http://social .capital.unl.edu/nirvanaquest.pdf 
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The control variable X3 is computed as variable X1 
multiplied by control, regarding to Q27 (“Generally, having 
complete control over the decision to move is on the 
extremely important-extremely unimportant scale”), which 
was reversed in order to represent the extent to which the 
respondent believes others are not likely to control the 
decision. It was reversed because we wished to form and test 
for a variable that would potentially dampen self-interest. 
We would expect that if the individual perceived it was more 
unlikely that someone could control their decision to move, 
then they would be less likely to express their self-interest in 
moving. It is just like Angyal [40] did and consistent with 
Sally[41], that individuals are most always wanting more 
freedom to choose, so if they have it already, they don’t have 
to, in this case, move away to obtain that freedom.  
The variable X5 is the average of an expectancy-valence or 
proxy for utility; in this case the self-interest utility gained by 
the respondent in her/his work. The other-interest utility X6, 
gained from relationships at work. 
Table 1.  Variables description 
Independent 
Variable Description Remark 
X1 
Tendency toward pursuing the 
self-interest Self-interest 
X2 
Interaction between variable X1 
and influence by others (relative, 
friends) 
Other interest 
X3 
Interaction between variable X1 and 
unlikely controlled by others’ 
decision 
Other- interest 
X4 Income Self-interest 
X5 Expected utility gained from work Self-interest 
X6 
Expected utility gained from 
relationship at work Other-interest 
3. Results 
The Probit model is used for the decision analysis in Step 
1, whether or not consider moving, and Table 2 present the 
results. 
Table 2.  Probit estimates on the individual decision to move 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-value 
X1  149.93 21.95 <0.0001 *** 
X2 -3.51 0.53 <0.0001 *** 
X3 -12.22 3.52 0.0005 *** 
X4 0.000023 0.000019 0.24 
X5 0.040 0.0096 <0.0001*** 
X6 0.023 0.010 0.026 ** 
X5*X6  -0.0012 0.0003 -<0.0001*** 
Constant -0.59 0.21 0.005 *** 
***, **, and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%; 5% and 10% 
respectively. Sample size is 665. 
Probit results show that all explanatory variables, except 
the income (X4), are statistically significant for the decision 
step, while variables associated with selfishness (X1), 
self-interest related to the current job (X5) and other-interest 
utility related to coworker relationship (X6) have a 
significantly positive impact on people’s decisions; and 
variables corresponding to self-interest conditioned on 
other-interest (X2), by other control (X3); and the interaction 
between self-interest and other-interest from work (X5*X6) 
have a significantly negative impact on people’s decision to 
leave. 
The positive impact means that the individuals with high 
level of self-interest are more likely to leave the community 
for extra money. The negative impact means that the 
individuals condition their own interest by other-interest or 
other control are less likely to leave the community for 
another financial opportunity. Notice that the income (X4) 
effect is statistically insignificant, suggesting the income 
essentially plays no role in the decision to stay or to leave, 
which provides even more support for our contention that 
something besides monetary considerations are at work in 
Nirvana in this first stage of decision.  
The results in Table 2 are generally within the 
expectations of traditional economics, regarding to those 
factors that drive decision to give up social capital in Nirvana 
for more money: i) X1, the more self(ish)-interested the 
individual, the more likely job is a major source to make a 
living in satisfying self-interest, and more likely they will 
choose leaving for more lucrative job opportunity; ii) X5, the 
more value individuals put on a job, the more likely they will 
choose leaving for a new job, that is, “the job” no matter 
where it is located has a high value in the self-interest sense; 
iii) X6, the more values collaborators at work, logically being 
able to have this same feature in a new job (the contingency 
describes how the job situation and working environment 
will be essentially the same, except the pay will be higher), 
the more likely to leave from easily building up new 
relationship at work with higher pay. What is really 
intriguing is the evidence found in this study supports the 
hypothesis that the empathy-sympathy based other-interest 
plays a substantive role as the self-interest does.  
Three other-interests variables (X2, X3, X5*X6) have a 
dampening effect on the individual’s decision to leave 
Nirvana. This is to say, being in sympathy with shared norms 
and shared interests arising in connections with others 
tempers the prudence-only, “Max U” (as noted earlier, see 
McCloskey [38], for a similar argument) drive characterized 
on path 0G. (iv) X2, the more consideration for others in the 
sense of empathizing and being in sympathy with them, the 
more likely tempering one’s own decision, the less likely the 
individual will choose to leave; (v)X3, the less perceived 
control there is on the individual’s own decision from others, 
the less likely the individual will choose leaving, and finally, 
(vi) X5*X6, the self-interest arising in the job itself is 
conditioned by the other-interest from work, suggesting that 
sharing more in the other-interests with co-workers from the 
current job, the less likely one is to leave for a new similar 
job. 
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The negative sign on X5*X6 is because there is some kind 
of feedback and interaction between the two interests, which 
make this job work well for these individuals, and makes 
them reluctant to leave it. In terms of support for what might 
motivate consuming social capital going beyond both 
traditional economic and sociological renditions, the most 
substantive findings are from significant role of others in 
conditioning self-interest (X2), and insignificant role of 
annual income (X4). Another substantive finding is that 
self-interest remains an important driver, because motivation 
is not purely about social networks and being bound in a 
community. Both economics and sociology gain strength 
from integrating these two main ideas into one framework. 
The Inverse Miller's Ratio (IMR) was created using 
Probit results from Step 1, capturing the correlation of 
decisions between Step 1 and Step 2. And IMR was used as 
one of the independent variables in Step 2 in order to correct 
for the sample selection bias problem. The coefficient of 
IMR is 0.98 (p-value=0.12), suggesting the existence of 
selection bias problem is insignificant and not much gain has 
been achieved from using the Heckman two stage method to 
run the analysis. Therefore, Table 3 reports the semi-log 
OLS estimation without including IMR for correcting 
sample selection bias. 
Table 3.  Semi-log OLS estimates of social capital value 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-value 
X2 4.0 1.52 0.0044*** 
X3 -9.67 7.12 0.91 
X4 0.000017 0.0000056 0.0013*** 
X5 0.074 0.014 0.012** 
X6 0.080 0.013 0.0067*** 
X5*X6 -0.0025 0.00046 0.98 
Constant 5.13 0.82 0.00 *** 
***, **, and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%; 5% and 10% 
respectively. Sample size is 438 
The semi-log OLS results in Table 3 show that for those 
willing to monetize it, X22 has a positive effect on the dollar 
value of social capital, which also supports the hypothesis. In 
Step 1, instead of presuming the consumer of social capital is 
a creature pursuing only self-interest or only other-interest, 
we see empathy-sympathy operating to create a shared 
other-interest conditioning on the self-interest. As argued 
earlier, standard economic theory was already challenged by 
the fact that 35- percent said “No”. Apparently, there was 
shared other-interest at work, a result that probably would 
not have surprised most sociologists, who may have 
expected it to be even 100 percent. Yet, Step 2 analysis gives 
more credence to traditional economic versions of this story 
too, in some sense also challenging sociology based versions 
of the story, in that for the 65-percent who said “Yes”. The 
                                                             
 
2 that the variable conditioning the self-interest due to the influence from 
significant others 
average required compensation was nearly $33 thousand, 
suggesting the monetary value of social capital to those 
willing to monetize it is substantial in the community, where 
the typical income is around $25 – 35 thousand. It would 
require a full doubling in income to leave their social capital 
behind. Also, as expected, control is no longer a force in the 
Step 2 decision. Once people visualizes actually moving and 
considers how much money to take, the individual has 
already disconnected the psychological and sociological 
sense from others, who might be perceived as controlling.  
By explicitly introducing both other-interest and 
self-interest into the framework, we are now supporting both 
standard economic and sociology theory, and their 
approaches. Sociology would suggest a role for the social 
connections represented in social capital, and not everything 
can be monetized, as supported in the Step 1 analysis; some 
sense of unity with the community of interests is an 
important driver. As economics teaches, self-interest plays a 
substantive role in both steps. For those willing to put a 
dollar value on it, standard economic theory predicts that the 
value is higher for one who has more income, or put more 
value on a job, or on co-workers, although the magnitude of 
income effect is tiny. Meta-economics predicts that both 
money and community-wide connections represent 
important features, at least for communities, which are 
economically and socially viable as that represented in 
Nirvana. 
4. Conclusions 
As Robison and Flora [19] argue, much of human 
behavior does not appear to be motivated by selfish 
preference for increases in physical goods and services. 
Examples of such behavior include unwillingness to move 
from one’s community for a significant pay increase, and 
attachment to things with little physical value. The social 
capital paradigm explains some of these 
nonmaterial-oriented behaviors by integrating behavioral 
concepts and assumptions from the fields of economics, 
psychology, and sociology.  
This study supports this contention, albeit we need to keep 
in mind this community was chosen for study in the first 
place as it represents an ideal, Nirvana-like place. As noted, 
the results reported in this case study of Nirvana also provide 
a new prospective into traditional theories in both economics 
and sociology. Perhaps even more importantly, at least 
pragmatically if not theoretically, this study sheds new light 
on understanding why some rural communities achieve a 
higher state of economic development and community 
vitality than others, with implications for community 
development strategies, and perhaps policy. It makes little 
sense, for example, to focus only on job-creation (i.e. 
corresponding to the view of the economic person), or only 
on leadership skills for enhancing community networks (i.e. 
corresponding to the perspective of the social person). Also, 
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the appropriate mix of these two thrusts depends on the 
nature of people of the community in question. Detailed 
profiles, using scales to characterize personality-types as 
well as other social (e.g. network) measures, are needed in 
order to customize policies and strategies that will work in a 
particular community. One size does not fit all.  
Yet, this is just one case study. To answer the question 
about what level of the self-interest conditioned by the 
shared other-interest works best will require further testing in 
various communities representing the full-spectrum of 
development. If further testing supports focusing on moving 
to the ideal orientation found in these studies, we would then 
have a scientific basis for designing and implementing 
policies and programs to bring about the economically viable 
community development. This paper also points to the fertile 
ground in the overlap areas of economy and sociology, 
seeing the important role for both the self and the other 
interest in economic and social choice, and further testing 
this meta-economics approach. 
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